The nature of concepts has been the long-standing focus of philosophical reflections and, more recently, of experimental empirical investigation. Imaging the human brain during conceptual processing in space and time now allows addressing these fundamental questions about human cognition objectively. Traditionally, starting with Immanuel Kant's philosophical considerations on categories, concepts are specified as abstract mental entities different from perceptual or motor brain systems 1, 2 : Sensory or motor information about objects and events is transformed into a common abstract representation format, in which original modality-specific information is lost.
Perceptual and motor representations play at best an epiphenomenal role for conceptual processing and are only evoked by imagery processes after the concept is fully accessed 3 .
Challenging this classical view, recent modality-specific approaches propose close links between the perceptual and motor brain systems on the one hand and the conceptual system on the other hand. They assume that concepts are embodied 4 in the sense that they are essentially grounded in perception and action [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] : Conceptual features (e.g., visual, acoustic, action-related) are stored in modality-specific brain areas typically involved in processing the corresponding sensory and motor information, respectively. According to this view, conceptual representations are established by the learning-based formation of cortical cell assemblies in sensory and motor areas during concept acquisition 7, 10 . For example, the repeated experience of picking up the receiver of a ringing telephone establishes cell assemblies in motor, auditory and visual cortex, which code action-related, acoustic and visual features, respectively. Ignition of these modality-specific cell assemblies either bottom-up by words and objects, or top-down by thought constitutes the concept (e.g., telephone).
Support for modality-specific approaches comes from behavioural 11 , neuropsychological 8 , electrophysiological 12 and neuroimaging studies 9 . Although some studies found activity in sensory brain areas during conceptual tasks convincing evidence for a link between perceptual and conceptual systems is missing so far:
Conceptual categories with a strong emphasis on visual features (i.e., natural kinds) elicited enhanced activity in visual brain areas 13 . However, these findings were not consistently replicated 14 , or could be alternatively explained by perceptual processing of the visual stimuli themselves 15, 16 or by post-conceptual strategic processes such as visual imagery 3 .
Bridging the gap between the perceptual and conceptual system, we investigated the neural representation of acoustic conceptual features during the recognition of visually presented object names. This procedure has two advantages: Firstly, perceptual processing of the stimulus can be easily distinguished from processing of the conceptual feature of interest at a functional and neural level. Secondly, the implicitness of the task discourages post-conceptual imagery strategies. Hence activity in auditory brain areas in response to a visual word must reflect conceptual processing of acoustic object features.
In brief, the critical question arises whether recognizing the word "telephone", for instance, suffices to rapidly ignite cell assemblies in auditory brain areas.
To address this question, we recorded brain responses during conceptual and perceptual processing of acoustic object features. Brain activity was measured with both high spatial (functional magnetic resonance imaging, fMRI) and high temporal resolution (event-related potentials, ERPs). In the conceptual task, participants performed lexical decisions on words that were visually presented among pseudowords.
The lexical decision task induces an implicit access to conceptual word meaning 17 , but does not afford explicit retrieval of specific conceptual information such as acoustic features. Words either named objects for which acoustic conceptual features were of high ("telephone") or low relevance ("envelope"). Word sets (with vs. without acoustic features) differed only with respect to the relevance of acoustic conceptual features, but were matched for confounding conceptual and linguistic variables (see also Supplementary Methods). In the perceptual task, participants listened to real sounds (e.g., ringing, barking). This task served as functional localizer to identify brain areas involved in the auditory processing of real sounds in comparison to acoustic coloured noise and a resting condition.
In the first two of three experiments, we assessed with fMRI whether conceptual In the perceptual task of experiment 2, we determined brain areas involved in listening to real sounds (p < .01, corrected for multiple comparisons across the entire brain). When contrasted to the resting condition, both active conditions (real sounds, acoustic noise) recruited the superior temporal cortex including the temporal plane bilaterally (Fig. 1B) . Based on the known neuroanatomy of the auditory system 18 , the temporal plane comprises primary auditory cortex while the neighbouring areas in superior and middle temporal gyri encompass auditory association areas. The MR signal was generally higher to real sounds than to acoustic noise in the temporal plane and in superior temporal cortex. Most importantly, the large cluster that responded to real sounds encompassed a region in left pSTG/MTG which overlapped with the cluster activated by words with acoustic conceptual features (Fig. 1C) . Hence, perceiving real sounds and processing of acoustic conceptual features share a common neural substrate in temporal cortex. imagery. Previous studies estimated that visual word recognition is completed at about 150 ms 19 . In our study, activity in response to acoustic conceptual features starts immediately thereafter at 150 ms. This early onset suggests that the activity observed in auditory association areas reflects access to acoustic conceptual features rather than imagery processes. Such post-conceptual processes can only be evoked later in time after the concept has been fully accessed.
Figure 4 about here
The involvement of pSTG/MTG in higher level sound processing has been shown by previous imaging studies as summarised in Fig. 4 . This region contributes to the processing of complex sounds including human voices 20, 21 and is activated during sound recognition 22 , episodic recall of sounds 23 , and music imagery 24, 25 . Activity in posterior superior temporal gyrus was also observed for decisions on acoustic object attributes 26 and during recognition of novel objects for which acoustic attributes were learned in a preceding training phase 27 . Patients with a lesion in this area exhibit sound recognition deficits 28 . The present study shows for the first time that pSTG/MTG is the neural substrate of acoustic conceptual features: This region responds to acoustic conceptual features even when probed implicitly with activity being specifically modulated by the differential relevance of acoustic conceptual features.
Unlike perceptual sound processing and sound imagery 24, 25 , conceptual processing of acoustic features is confined to higher-level auditory association cortex and does not encompass primary and secondary auditory cortex within the temporal plane. These differences in functional neuroanatomy might reflect differences in experiential quality. Conceptual processing of acoustic features lack the vivid sensory experience typically present in perception and imagery: Obviously, we do not experience a "ringing" sound when reading the word "telephone". Left pSTG/MTG may therefore serve as an auditory convergence zone 29 that codes higher-level acoustic object information contributing to a concept. Although perceptual and conceptual processing of acoustic features considerably overlap in functional neuroanatomy as demonstrated here, both levels of representation are not identical.
In conclusion, our results provide strong evidence for a link between perceptual and conceptual acoustic processing, with the left pSTG/MTG as the shared neural substrate. Hence, conceptual processing of acoustic features involves a partial reinstatement of brain activity during perceptual experience. Our findings are important for several reasons: Firstly, they resolve the fierce debate about the nature of concepts, which meanwhile lasts for several hundred years. They clearly demonstrate that concepts are essentially grounded in the perceptual brain systems and refute the notion of concepts as abstract, amodal mental entities. Secondly, they draw a strong parallel with the functional neuroanatomy of episodic or working memory systems, in which retrieval of sensory properties of an event recruits corresponding modality-specific cortex 23 . This renders it likely that modality-specificity is a general organizational principle in cortical memory representation. Finally, they stress the necessity of sensory experiences in the relevant modalities in order to acquire a rich, fully developed concept of the environment. Conversely, a lack of multimodal sensory experience such as during extensive TV or video game exposure would result in an impoverished development of conceptual representations in children. The modality-specific nature of concepts could also explain why a consensus about the meaning of abstract concepts such as "freedom"
or "justice" is notoriously difficult to achieve unless embedded in a concrete, experienced situation. Hence, appropriate knowledge of the nature of concepts is fundamental for interacting successfully with one's physical and social world.
Methods
Sixteen healthy right-handed native German-speaking subjects participated in the fMRI experiments (experiments 1 and 2), and a new sample of twenty subjects participated in the ERP experiment (experiment 3).
For the conceptual task (experiments 1 and 3), participants were presented with visual words and legally spelled pseudowords. Participants decided as quickly and as accurately as possible whether or not the presented letter string formed a real word (lexical decision task). Half of the words referred to objects with high relevance, the other half to objects with low relevance of acoustic features. Both word sets included an equal amount of living and non-living objects. They differed only with regard to acoustic features, but not to visual and motor features as well as to emotional valence according to a prior rating study. Sets were also equated for word length and frequency.
For the perceptual task (experiment 2), eight blocks of real sounds from animals and objects as well as acoustic noise stimuli were presented binaurally via headphones.
Each acoustic stimulation block was followed by a resting block, in which only the fixation cross was presented. Participants listened to the acoustic stimuli while maintaining fixation.
Functional MR images (experiments 1 and 2) were recorded with a 3 Tesla Allegra MRI system (Siemens, Erlangen, Germany) using a T2*-weighted EPI sequence. Data were preprocessed and analyzed statistically in a random effects model with SPM2 (http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/spm2.html). ERP scalp potentials (experiment 3) were collected using an equidistant montage of 64 electrodes. ERPs to words with and without acoustic conceptual features were statistically compared using repeated measures analyses of variance. In order to determine the neural sources, we calculated maps of estimated cortical currents from the grand mean ERPs according to the minimum-norm method 30 . 
